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Abstract 
This research investigates whether audit committees are associated with improved 
earnings quality for a sample of Australian listed companies prior to the introduction of 
mandatory audit committee requirements in 2003. Two measures of earnings quality are 
used based on models first developed by Jones (1991) and Dechow and Dichev (2002).   
Our results indicate that formation of an audit committee reduces intentional earnings 
management but not accrual estimation errors.  We also find differences in the 
associations between audit committee accounting expertise and the two earnings quality 
measures.  Other audit committee characteristics examined are not significantly related to 
either earnings quality measure.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between audit 
committees and earnings quality in Australia. We examine two key aspects of this 
relation, audit committee formation and audit committee characteristics.  We use 
measures of earnings quality based on models first developed by Jones (1991) and 
Dechow and Dichev (2002). Measures based on the Jones „earnings management‟ model 
are generally characterised as capturing managements‟ intent to manipulate earnings, 
while measures based on Dechow and Dichev‟s „accrual estimation error‟ model include 
accrual estimation errors arising from management lapses or environmental uncertainties.   
Improved quality of financial reporting practices, and more specifically earnings, 
has been widely cited as one of the major benefits of companies establishing audit 
committees (Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999; Australian Accounting Research Foundation 
(AARF) et al., 2001; Ramsay, 2001). However, the approach adopted by the Australian 
Stock Exchange (ASX)
1
 from the early 1990s to 2003 was one of disclosure only, 
requiring listed companies to provide statements about their main corporate governance 
practices, including whether they had an audit committee and if appropriate, why they did 
not comply with best practice guidelines.  Audit committees only became mandatory in 
2003 for those listed companies on the S & P All Ordinaries Index following the 
recommendations of the ASX Corporate Governance Council
2
 (ASX Corporate 
                                                 
1
 Following the merger of the Australian Stock Exchange with the Sydney Future Exchange in 2006, the 
ASX became the Australian Securities Exchange. 
2
 A second edition of these recommendations was issued in 2007, but the 2003 edition applies to this study.  
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Governance Council, 2003).
3
  Given the previous relative lack of audit committee 
regulation in Australia as compared to the US and other overseas jurisdictions
4
, pre-2003 
Australia represents a rich empirical setting for the analysis of the association between 
audit committees and earnings quality.  
Davidson et al. (2005) and Koh et al. (2007) are the only known published studies 
to utilise this voluntary institutional setting to explore the relationship between audit 
committees and earnings quality. We extend their research in several ways.  First, we 
capture earnings quality using measures of accrual estimation errors as well as abnormal 
accruals.  The accrual estimation errors measure is a more comprehensive measure of 
earnings quality.  We are not aware of any prior published research into the relationship 
between audit committees and earnings quality that uses measures based on Dechow and 
Dichev‟s (2002) accrual estimation errors model.  A comparison of our results between 
these two earnings quality measures allows us to investigate the potential impact of audit 
committees on different aspects of earnings quality.
5
  Second, we examine whether 
earnings quality increases following the voluntary formation of an audit committee.  
While several studies including Davidson et al. (2005) have examined whether the 
existence of an audit committee is associated with earnings quality, tests of this 
association do not differentiate between whether (a) the audit committee impacts earnings 
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 In addition, entities in the top 300 of the Index are now required to comply with the ASX Corporate 
Governance Council‟s best practice recommendations relating to the composition, operation and 
responsibility of the audit committee (Australian Stock Exchange, 2006). 
4
 Audit committees have been mandatory on the major US stock exchanges since as early as 1978 
(Vanasco, 1994). More recently, there has been an increasing trend around the world towards requiring 
listed companies to not only establish audit committees, but also to ensure that they meet pre-specified 
requirements including composition and reporting obligations.  For example, in the US following 
recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999), the New York Stock Exchange and the National 
Association of Securities Dealers changed their listing rules to require listed companies to maintain audit 
committees with at least three directors, all of whom are independent of management (Klein, 2003). 
5
 Unpublished research by Dhaliwal et al. (2006) and Kent et al. (2008) use measures based on the Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) model to capture accruals quality.  However neither of these studies makes comparisons 
between measures of accruals quality and earnings management. 
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quality or (b) firms with high quality earnings are more likely to form an audit 
committee. Overseas research (Wild, 1994; Jeon et al., 2004) has found mixed evidence 
about the impact of audit committee formation on earnings quality.  Third, in addition to 
the audit committee characteristics examined by Davidson et al. (2005) and Koh et al. 
(2007), we investigate the impact of audit committee expertise on earnings quality.  
Recent unpublished work in the US by Dhaliwal et al. (2006) reports an association 
between audit committee accounting expertise and accruals quality.  Finally, we use a 
more refined measure of audit committee independence than that used in prior Australian 
studies that investigate the association between audit committee characteristics and 
earnings quality (Davidson et al., 2005; Koh et al., 2007).  
Our results suggest that earnings quality increases in the year following voluntary 
audit committee formation.  However this is only the case when earnings quality is 
captured using measures based on Jones‟ (1991) earning management model rather than 
Dechow and Dichev‟s (2002) accrual estimation error model.  This result appears to 
indicate that audit committees are effective in reducing intentional accrual manipulations, 
which are better captured by the Jones model.  We also find differences in the 
associations between audit committee accounting expertise and the two earnings quality 
measures.  When we capture earnings quality using accrual estimation errors, we find 
higher earnings quality (lower accrual estimation errors) for companies with a greater 
proportion of qualified accountants on their audit committee.  However, we do not find a 
similar reduction in earnings management.  Indeed, we find some evidence that suggests 
higher abnormal accruals for firms with a greater proportion of accounting expertise on 
their audit committee.  Results pertaining to our other audit committee characteristics are 
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similar to those found by Davidson et al. (2005) with the exception of audit committee 
independence.  Using our more refined measure of independence, we find that this audit 
committee characteristic does not impact earnings quality. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 outlines the prior 
literature and hypotheses tested in this paper. Section 3 delineates our earnings quality 
measures, while Section 4 describes the empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
2. Prior literature and hypotheses 
2.1 Audit committee formation 
Several prior studies provide empirical support for a cross-sectional association 
between audit committees and financial reporting quality (e.g., McMullen, 1996; Dechow 
et al., 1996; Beasley et al., 2000). However, the research designs used in these prior 
studies are unable to establish whether the existence of an audit committee per se impacts 
earnings quality. For a more direct test of the impact of audit committees on earnings 
quality, it is necessary to consider changes in earnings quality subsequent to the 
formation of an audit committee.   
The only known published study that directly examines the association between 
the formation of audit committees, earnings management and, inversely, earnings quality 
is Jeon et al. (2004). Contrary to expectations, their findings indicate that earnings 
management did not significantly decrease in the period after audit committee formation. 
These results conflict with those of Wild (1994) who finds a significant increase in the 
market's reaction to earnings reports released after audit committee formation.  
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We propose an association between the formation of an audit committee and an 
increase in earnings quality. Tests will allow a direct assessment of whether the voluntary 
formation of an audit committee is followed by an increase in earnings quality for our 
sample of Australian companies. 
H1: The formation of an audit committee is associated with an increase in 
earnings quality.  
2.2 Audit committee characteristics 
Independence 
The independence of an audit committee is often considered an essential 
characteristic influencing the committee‟s effectiveness in overseeing the financial 
reporting process. It can be argued that independent directors are in the best position to 
serve as active overseers of the financial reporting process, thereby having a greater 
ability to withstand pressure from management to manipulate earnings (Klein, 2002).  
Audit committee independence has been found to be significantly associated with 
measures of earnings quality in several prior studies (e.g., Klein, 2002; Bedard et al., 
2004; Choi et al., 2004; Van der Zahn and Tower, 2004; Davidson et al., 2005; Vafeas, 
2005). However, within these studies, there are some inconsistencies in the results. For 
example, Klein (2002) finds no evidence of a significant association between an audit 
committee comprised solely of independent directors and her measure of earnings 
management. Whereas, Bedard et al. (2004) find that the same measure of audit 
committee independence is negatively associated with the likelihood of aggressive 
earnings management.  
 7 
Expertise 
In addition to independence, the expertise of the audit committee is generally 
considered an important characteristic for its effective operation. It has been argued that 
effective oversight by an audit committee requires that its members possess sufficient 
expertise in accounting and auditing to independently assess the matters that are 
presented to them (Beasley and Salterio, 2001; Davidson et al., 2004; DeFond et al., 
2005).  
Several prior studies have found a significant association between the expertise of 
the audit committee and earnings quality (e.g., Xie et al., 2003; Bedard et al., 2004; Choi 
et al., 2004; Dhaliwal et al., 2006). However, some inconsistencies exist between the 
results of these studies and others such as Van der Zahn and Tower (2004) who failed to 
find an association between the magnitude of earnings management and the audit 
committee's financial expertise amongst the independent directors.  
Activity and size  
The level of activity of an audit committee has been recommended as important to 
enhance its effectiveness in improving earnings quality. Menon and Williams (1994) 
suggest that the mere formation of an audit committee does not mean that the committee 
is actually relied on by the board of directors to enhance its monitoring ability. Choi et al. 
(2004, p.41) argue that an "…actively functioning audit committee is more likely to 
detect earnings management than a dormant committee." In addition, the size of an audit 
committee can have a positive impact on earnings quality. Larger audit committees can 
be more effective as they are likely to include members with varied expertise to perform 
more intense monitoring of financial reporting practices (Choi et al., 2004).   
 8 
Inconsistent results in the prior studies also exist for the association between audit 
committee activity and earnings management or earnings quality. While Xie et al. (2003), 
Van der Zahn and Tower (2004) and Vafeas (2005) find evidence of a significant 
association between these variables, Choi et al. (2004), Bedard et al. (2004) and 
Davidson et al. (2005) find that audit committee activity is not significantly related to 
earnings management. Similar inconsistent results also exist in relation to the size of the 
audit committee. We use the following hypothesis: 
H2: The independence, expertise, activity, and size of an audit committee are 
positively associated with earnings quality. 
3. Earnings quality measures 
3.1 Earnings quality vs earnings management 
This paper uses two measures of earnings quality. The first measure uses a 
modified version of the Jones (1991) model of discretionary accruals. This measure has 
been widely used in the literature to capture earnings management, which can be viewed 
as an inverse measure of earnings quality.  Schipper (1989, p. 92) defines earnings 
management as "…a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, 
with the intent of obtaining some private gain." Under this perspective, opportunistic 
earnings management negatively impacts on the quality of earnings, i.e., the greater the 
earnings management, the lower the earnings quality.
6
 
Our second measure of earnings quality uses a modified version of the Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) accrual estimation errors model.  This model is based on the argument 
that estimation errors in accruals and subsequent corrections of these errors decrease the 
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 An alternative view is that earnings are managed to allow managers to reveal more private information to 
users about the financial reports (Schipper, 1989; Healey and Wahlen, 1999). 
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quality of accruals and earnings. However, unlike the Jones (1991) type models of 
discretionary accruals, no attempt is made to separate the intentional from the 
unintentional accrual estimation errors (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). This is because both 
types of errors imply low quality earnings.  
3.2  Measures of Earnings Quality 
We capture earnings quality using absolute value measures from the two models 
described below.  The sign of these measures is deemed not to be relevant since all 
deviations from underlying earnings reduce earnings quality, regardless of their direction.  
They are inverse measures of earnings quality. We use cross-sectional rather than time-
series specifications for each of our measures since we require measures of earnings 
quality for specific firm years. Information on the Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS) is used to form the industry matched samples required to calculate our earnings 
quality variables.  To ensure sufficient degrees of freedom and enhance the validity of 
these measures, we limit our sample to companies in those industry groups that had 20 or 
more companies listed on the ASX.  For companies in large industry groups, our industry 
matched samples comprise 30 companies.  
Our first measure of earnings quality (EQJones) is based on the modified version 
of the Jones (1991) discretionary accruals model proposed by Dechow et al. (1995).
7
  We 
use cross-sectional samples of companies in the same industry groups as the sample 
companies. The absolute value of discretionary accruals is used as our first measure of 
earnings quality (EQJones).  
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 This version of the Jones (1991) model includes the change in receivables in the equation used to estimate 
the industry specific coefficients. Since this model is well established in the literature, we do not provide 
further details about how we calculate discretionary accruals here. 
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It has been argued that there is the potential for discretionary accruals models to 
misclassify expected accruals as unexpected because of the incompleteness of the 
expected accruals model (Bernard and Skinner, 1996; Larcker and Richardson, 2004). 
Guay et al. (1996) suggests that their evidence was consistent with the models estimating 
discretionary accruals with considerable imprecision and/or misspecification. Hansen 
(1999) concludes that studies relying entirely on the validity of discretionary accruals 
models were likely to under- or overstate proposed earnings management behaviour. 
Dechow et al. (1995) demonstrates that discretionary accruals models typically generated 
tests of low power for earnings management of economically plausible magnitudes. 
In an attempt to overcome criticisms of the modified Jones model, we use an 
additional proxy for earnings quality. Our second measure of earnings quality (EQDD) 
uses the cross-sectional version of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual estimation 
error model employed by Francis et al. (2005).
8
  McNichols (2002) provides a critique of 
the Dechow and Dichev (DD) model
9
.  Following McNichols‟ (2002) critique and 
associated recommendations for improvement, Francis et al. (2005) add two variables 
from the Jones (1991) model, i.e., the change in current sales and the level of property 
plant and equipment. 
We calculate EQDD by estimating the modified following regression for each 
sample company relative to its industry group of companies for each of the years of 
interest. All variables in equation (4) are divided by average total assets: 
WCt = b0 + b1CFOt-1 + b2CFOt + b3CFOt+1 + b4Salest + b5PPEt +t        (4) 
                                                 
8
 Our results are essentially unchanged when the original Dechow and Dichev (2002) model is used. 
9
 McNichols (2002) identifies several specific areas of weakness with the DD model. These include a 
failure to separately consider how total accruals might be affected by the behaviour of discretionary 
accruals. 
 11 
Where:  
WCt = Working capital in year t i.e. Accounts receivable + Inventory - 
Accounts payable - Taxes payable + Other assets (net); 
CFOt-1 = Cash flows from operations in year t – 1; 
CFOt = Cash flows from operations in year t; 
CFOt+1 = Cash flows from operations year in year t + 1; 
Salest = Sales in year t less sales in year t – 1; 
PPEt = Gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
 
This measure of earnings quality captures the extent to which accruals map into 
cash flow realisations in past, present and future cash flows.  Francis et al. (2005) use the 
standard deviation of the residuals from this model as a measure of earnings quality.  
However, we are not able to use the standard deviation of the residuals from our cross-
sectional industry model since this would provide a measure of earnings quality across all 
companies in the industry group rather than just the company of interest.  Following 
Srinidhi and Gul (2007) who also need to capture this measure on a firm-year basis, we 
use the absolute value of the residual as our measure of earnings quality. The higher the 
absolute residual for each sample company, the lower is the quality of earnings.  
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Data and sample  
The financial statement data items used to estimate our earnings quality measures 
are extracted from the Aspect Financial Database (SIRCA Ltd, 2004). To facilitate testing 
of hypothesis 1 which proposes an association between audit committee formation and an 
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increase in earnings quality, these variables are estimated for the years before and after 
audit committee formation.  That is, we use industry matched samples to estimate our 
earnings quality measures for both the pre and post formation years. In addition, they are 
re-estimated for each of our sample firms in 2001, since this is the year used to test the 
associations between earnings quality and audit committee independence, expertise, 
activity, and size proposed in hypothesis 2.
10
  
Data required for these audit committee variables is hand collected from the 2001 
annual reports. Audit committee independence and expertise for each director is assessed 
from disclosures about directors‟ backgrounds, qualifications and experience.  The 
definition of director independence as specified by the ASX Corporate Governance 
Council (2003) was used
11
.  Accounting and legal expertise are defined in terms of 
professional qualifications. 
[Insert table 1 here] 
The sample is drawn from the top 500 Australian companies listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) with financial years ending during 2001. Sample 
selection procedures and final sample sizes for hypotheses tests are shown in Table 1.  
We exclude companies without an audit committee (37) and those companies for which it 
could not be determined whether an audit committee existed (4). Banks, trusts and 
foreign companies (37) are also excluded since financial reporting requirements for these 
companies differ from those of other companies listed on the ASX.  Companies in the 
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 This year is selected as the base year to avoid any effects of companies anticipating the new ASX listing 
rule requiring audit committees to be formed by all companies in the S&P All Ordinaries Index. This new 
rule came into effect from 1 January 2003.   
11
 Essentially, independent directors are non-executive directors who do not have a business or other 
relationship with the firm that could interfere with their ability to act independently. These assessments 
were made by one author based on annual report information and validated by the other. 
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Diversified Financials and Real Estate industry groups (15) are excluded because they do 
not typically generate any sales revenue, which is needed to calculate our earnings quality 
variables.  As we require sufficiently large numbers of companies to form the industry 
matched samples needed to calculate our measures of earning quality, we delete 74 
companies from several small GICS industry groups
12
. Finally, we delete 24 companies 
where complete annual report data for 2001 is not available. This leaves a final sample 
size of 309 companies for tests of the association between audit committee characteristics 
and earnings quality (H2). Table 2 Panel A shows the industry breakdown of our sample. 
[Insert table 2 here] 
Further deletions from our sample are needed for tests of the association between 
the formation of an audit committee and earnings quality (H1). In particular, we exclude 
companies for which we are unable to reliably determine the audit committee formation 
year from annual reports.  These comprise companies whose audit committees were 
formed prior to 1993 requirements to disclose audit committees in annual reports (80), 
those that listed on the ASX with an audit committee already in place (133), and those for 
which pre/post formation year annual report data is not available (24). This left a sample 
of 72 companies for tests of hypothesis one.  Panel B of Table 2 shows the number of 
companies forming their audit committee by year. The higher numbers of formations 
during the 1994 to 1996 period suggest that the 1993 introduction of disclosure 
requirements provided an impetus for some companies to form an audit committee. 
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 These industry groups were Automobiles and Components; Consumer Durables and Apparel; Food and 
Staples Retailing; Household and Personal Products; Transportation; Insurance; Semiconductors and 
Semiconductor Equipment; and Utilities. 
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4.2 Audit committee formation and earnings quality 
To determine the effect of audit committee formation on earnings quality, we 
compare our earnings quality measures between the years before and after each 
company‟s audit committee was formed. Panel A of Table 3 shows the results of 
matched-pairs t-tests for significant differences for these accruals measures pre and post 
audit committee formation.
13
  For the accruals levels variables derived from the modified 
Jones (1991) model, the mean for EQJones(post) (0.1370) is significantly less than the 
mean for EQJones(pre) (0.2033). This result suggests that earnings quality calculated 
based on the Jones (1991) model is significantly higher in the year after formation of the 
audit committees compared to the year before audit committee formation. These results 
support our first hypothesis that the formation of an audit committee is associated with an 
increase in earnings quality.  
[Insert table 3 here] 
However, the results for the measure of earnings quality based on the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model do not show a significant difference between the years before and 
after audit committee formation. Correlation coefficients between EQJones and EQDD 
are not significant (see Table 5), indicating that these two measures capture quite 
different aspects of earnings quality.  It is possible that the observed change in EQJones 
between the pre and post formation years is due to factors other than the formation of the 
audit committee, such as changes in the board and auditor.  To control for the impact of 
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 A preliminary analysis of the distributions for our earnings quality variables revealed a small number of 
extreme outliers as well as positive skewness.  Three extreme outliers are excluded from the analysis for 
EQJones, while one is excluded for EQDD.  Wilcoxon signed ranks tests using the full sample yield the 
same inferences, as do sensitivity tests using logged transformations. 
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these potentially correlated omitted variables on the relationship between earnings quality 
and audit committee formation, the following pooled regression is estimated: 
 
EQ = a + b0 FORMATION + b1 ROA + b2 BDIND + b3 BDACCEX + b4 BDLEGEX 
+ b 5 BDCMEET + b6 BDSIZE + b7 AUDITOR +      (5) 
 
FORMATION is a dummy variable that equals zero in the pre formation year 
and one in the post formation year.  Each of our control variables is measured in both the 
pre and post formation years.  Return on assets (ROA) is included to control for potential 
changes in firm performance. It is possible that the observed increase in earnings quality 
could be associated with a change in firm performance. Prior research has shown that the 
measurement of discretionary accruals can be problematic for firms with extreme 
financial performance (Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 2005).  It is also possible that 
changes to the board of directors or company auditor occurring at the same time that the 
audit committees were formed could be associated with the increase in earnings quality.  
Hence, we include controls for board independence (BDIND), size (BDSIZE), accounting 
expertise (BDACCEX), legal expertise (BDLEGEX), meetings per year (BDMEET), and 
auditor quality (AUDITOR) for both the pre and post audit committee formation years.      
Results of these pooled regressions are shown in Panel B of Table 3. The results 
indicate that audit committee formation remains significantly associated with EQJones 
when these other potential explanations are controlled.   The negative coefficient on 
FORMATION indicates that when this variable equals one (the post audit committee 
formation year), EQJones is lower; thus indicating less earnings management and hence 
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higher earnings quality.  ROA and BDMEET are also significantly negatively associated 
with EQJones.  None of these variables are significantly correlated with EQDD.
14
   
Our EQJones results support those of Wild (1994) who finds a significant increase 
in the market reaction to earnings reports released after the formation of the audit 
committee. However they are inconsistent with the results of Jeon et al. (2004) who find 
no significant decrease in earnings management for Korean firms after they established 
audit committees. A potential reason for the inconsistency between our results and those 
of Jeon et al. is the different legal environments between Korea and Australia. Their 
sample included a majority that were required by Korean government law to establish an 
audit committee. The period of study for our paper was prior to the mandatory 
requirement for audit committee formation by large Australian listed companies, which 
came into effect on 1 January 2003. Companies that form audit committees voluntarily, 
not because of a government requirement, are likely to be more effective at constraining 
earnings management and therefore improving earnings quality. This is because they 
have other incentives to ensure their audit committees operate effectively, which also 
drive the decision to voluntarily form an audit committee. 
4.3 Audit committee characteristics and earnings quality 
Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the tests of 
association between audit committee characteristics and earnings quality (H2) as well as 
several control variables relevant to this association.  The mean and median values for 
EQJones are similar to those reported by Davidson et al. (2005) for their absolute 
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 Extreme outliers are excluded for these tests.  Results of sensitivity tests using logged transformations of 
our EQ variables yield the same inferences about the significance relationship between audit committee 
formation and EQJones.   
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discretionary accruals measure that is based on the same cross-sectional modified Jones 
model that we use. We exclude several outliers for EQJones and EQDD from our primary 
analysis and also report results of sensitivity analysis using logged transformations of our 
earnings quality measures.   
Overall, the descriptive statistics indicate that there is considerable variation in the 
audit committee variables for the sample companies. The mean proportion of independent 
directors on the audit committee is 0.53. Prior US studies such as Yang and Krishnan 
(2005) provide evidence that audit committees in the United States have much higher 
proportions of independent directors, which reflects the greater degree of audit committee 
regulation. Our measures of ACMEET and ACSIZE are slightly higher than those 
reported by Davidson et al. (2005).  This is most likely due to the larger average size of 
the firms in our sample and the exclusion of firms without an audit committee from our 
sample. Descriptive statistics for full board level variables that correspond to our audit 
committee variables are also shown in Table 4.  Davidson et al. (2005) and Koh et al. 
(2007) found board independence to impact earnings quality.  It is likely that some of the 
other board level variables are also associated with earnings quality. The remaining 
variables in Table 4 are controls for auditor quality, leverage, firm size, losses and 
operating cycle.   
[Insert table 4 here] 
 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) identify several innate factors that affect accruals 
quality: firm size, the incidence of losses, operating cycle, and volatility of operating cash 
flows and sales.  Our sample includes firms ranging in size from total assets of $3.94M to 
$84.96B, with a mean of $1.28B.  The distribution of total assets is highly positively 
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skewed and we therefore take a log transformation of this variable (LNTA).    LOSS 
equals 1 if income for the year is less than zero, 0 otherwise. 108 of the sample firms 
report a loss in 2001.  Length of operating cycle is measured as 360/(sales/average 
account receivables). Operating cycles for our sample firms range between 0 and 1050 
days, with a mean of 65.68 days.  This variable is highly positively skewed and we 
therefore use a log transformation for our hypotheses tests (LNOPCYCLE). We do not 
include controls for volatility of operating cash flows or sales since we are unable to 
obtain a sufficient time-series of data to calculate these measures for the majority of our 
sample firms. 
Table 5 shows Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients between the 
earnings quality, audit committee, full board and control variables.  For EQJones, 
Pearson correlations show significant positive relationships with LOSS and LNOC, while 
Spearman correlations show significant relationships with ACACCEX (+), BDIND (-), 
BDACCEX (+), BDSIZE (-) and LOSS (+).  The Spearman correlations between 
EQJones and both ACACCEX and BDACCEX are positive rather than negative as 
expected.  This result appears to suggest that accounting expertise could be related to an 
increase rather than a decrease in earnings management. When we use a log 
transformation of EQJones, Pearson correlations with ACACCEX, BDACCEX, LOSS 
and LNOC are all positive and significant, while BDSIZE is significantly negatively 
associated with EQJones.  Overall, these results do not support the relations between 
EQJones and the audit committee characteristics predicted in H2.   
[Insert table 5 here] 
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When we consider EQDD, Pearson correlations show significant negative 
relationships between this measure of earnings quality and ACACCEX, ACSIZE, 
BDSIZE, LNTA, and a significant positive relation with LOSS.  Spearman correlations 
support these results and also show a significant positive relation between EQDD and 
LNOC.  When we use a log transformation of EQDD, the same variables remain 
significant.   These results indicate initial support for the predicted H2 relations between 
earnings quality and audit committee size and accounting expertise. 
Not surprisingly, most of our audit committee and full board level variables are 
very highly correlated; with the correlation coefficients for the independence and 
expertise measures ranging between 0.69 and 0.78.  Further, audit committee size is 
significantly positively correlated with full board size and firm size.  Interestingly, the 
two measures of audit committee expertise (ACACCEX and ACLEGEX) are 
significantly negatively correlated with each other. This suggests that the two forms of 
expertise are substitutes for each other.  
We use the following regression model to test our second hypothesis that earnings 
quality is positively associated with audit committee independence, expertise, activity 
and size. EQ denotes the two earnings quality measures described above (EQJones and 
EQDD). This model is estimated on our sample of listed Australian companies in 2001:   
 
EQ = a  + b1 ACIND + b2 ACACCEX + b3 ACLEGEX + b4 ACMEET  +  
b5 ACSIZE + b6 AUDITOR + b7 LNTA + b8 LEV + b9 LOSS + b10LNOC +     
           (6)  
 
In addition, we run the above model substituting a series of industry dummy 
variables for LNOC.  This allows us to use a larger sample since we were able to collect 
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data about industry membership for all of our sample firms, while we were only able to 
obtain operating cycle data for 284 of our sample firms.  We rerun this model controlling 
for full board independence, expertise, activity and size. Several of these variables are 
significantly positively correlated with their corresponding audit committee measures and 
that is why we exclude them from equation 6.  However, some of these board variables 
are significantly associated with our EQ measures and we therefore attempt to control for 
their impact by including them in a sensitivity test of this model. 
Table 6 shows the results from OLS regressions of equation 6. None of our audit 
committee variables are significantly associated with EQJones. Similarly, Davidson et al. 
(2005) report insignificant coefficients for ACMEET and ACSIZE, and mixed results for 
ACIND depending on how it is measured.
15
  Our results indicate that EQDD is 
significantly negatively correlated with ACACCEX indicating that this measure of 
earnings quality is higher when there are a greater proportion of audit committee 
members with accounting expertise.  This result is consistent with Dhaliwal et al. (2006) 
who find a significant positive relation between accounting expertise and accruals 
quality.  Our other audit committee variables are not significantly related to EQDD.
16
   
[Insert table 6 here] 
When logged transformations of our EQ variables are used, EQDD remains 
significantly negatively associated with ACACCEX, while EQJones is significantly 
                                                 
15
 These authors proxy audit committee independence using a dichotomous non-executive director measure 
and find mixed results depending on whether they code this variable with a value of one if the audit 
committee is comprised entirely of non-executive directors or a majority. In sensitivity tests, their 
significant results for this variable become insignificant when they remove non-executive directors that had 
related party transactions. 
16
 We also examine a summary measure of the overall strength of the sample companies' audit committees. 
This variable (AC_GOV_SCORE) is calculated as the sum of each of the audit committee dichotomous 
variables discussed above. There is a significant negative Pearson correlation between AC_GOV_SCORE 
and EQDD. However, this relation is not significant in a multivariate context.  
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positively associated with this variable. When we add the full board variables to our 
models, the relationship between EQDD and ACACCEX becomes insignificant and the 
remainder of our results are qualitatively the same.  Given the high correlation between 
our board and audit committee accounting expertise variables (r = 0.77), it is difficult to 
reliably interpret this result. We therefore rerun our EQDD models with BDACCEX 
instead of ACACCEX and find that BDACCEX is not significantly related to EQDD.  
This result suggests that it is accounting expertise at the audit committee level rather than 
the full board level that positively impacts earnings quality. 
The results for control variables shown in table 6 indicate significant associations 
between EQDD and LNTA, and between EQJones and LNTA and AUDITOR, as well as 
some mixed results for LEV, LOSS and LNOC.  The significant positive relations that we 
observe between EQJones and ACACCEX and AUDITOR are contrary to expectations.  
Several of the industry dummy variables are significant for EQJones, which captures 
variation in the exercise of discretionary accruals across industries.   
Overall, H2 is generally not supported, with the exception of audit committee 
accounting expertise when the EQDD measure of earnings quality is considered.  The 
weight of evidence suggests that the higher the proportion of accounting expertise a 
company has on its audit committee, the lower its accrual estimation errors.   
5. Conclusions  
This research investigates the association between audit committees and earnings 
quality in Australia.  The time period for the research is selected to avoid the confounding 
effects of mandatory audit committee requirements introduced for Australian companies 
in 2003. We hypothesise that the formation of an audit committee is associated with an 
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increase in earnings quality (H1); and the independence, expertise, activity, and size of an 
audit committee are positively associated with earnings quality (H2). Overall, the results 
provide support for H1, but not H2. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from our results. First, we find that a 
discretionary accruals measure based on the Jones (1991) earnings management model, 
decreases significantly in the year following audit committee formation.  Since measures 
based on this model are generally characterised as capturing managements‟ intent to 
manipulate earnings, our results imply that the establishment of an audit committee is an 
effective way to reduce earnings management, and hence improve the quality of earnings. 
When we capture accrual estimation errors using measures based on Dechow and 
Dichev‟s (2002) model, we do not find an increase in earnings quality following audit 
committee formation.  This disparity in results between the two types of earnings quality 
measures highlights the potential impact of audit committees.  While improved quality of 
financial reporting practices has been widely cited as a major benefit of audit committees, 
this result appears to indicate that this improvement most likely occurs through a 
reduction in earnings manipulations rather than lower accrual estimation errors deriving 
from management lapses or environmental uncertainties.  A caveat on these results is the 
relatively small sample size available for tests of H1. 
Second, when we capture earnings quality using an accrual estimation errors 
measure, we find that audit committee accounting expertise is associated with higher 
quality earnings.  However we do not find the same association when we capture earnings 
quality using an earnings management measure.  Indeed, we find some evidence of higher 
earnings management for firms with a greater proportion of qualified accountants on their 
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audit committees.  Future research that explores this result further may be able to shed 
some light on this unexpected finding. A potential limitation of our research relates to the 
endogeneity of audit committees.  The characteristics of audit committees are not 
necessarily independent of earnings quality.  Companies with higher quality earnings 
may be more likely to choose audit committee characteristics that signal the strength of 
their financial reporting system (Engel, 2005). 
Overall, our results highlight the multifaceted nature of earnings quality and the 
potential for audit committees to impact it.  As we have found, different measures of 
earnings quality can lead to different results and inferences. Each of the available models 
of earnings quality has its own particular limitations and these should be considered when 
interpreting our results. Additional research that separates out the intentional and 
unintentional components of the accrual estimation errors would help to further clarify 
which aspects of earnings quality audit committees tend to improve.   
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Table 1 
Summary of sample sizes used for hypotheses tests 
 
Top 500 ASX listed companies in 2001 500 
Less, 
 -Companies without audit committees 37 
 -Audit committee existence could not be determined   4 
 - Banks, trusts and foreign companies 37 
- Diversified financials and real estate 15 
- Companies from small four digit GICS industry groups 74 167 
  333 
   
Less, Complete annual report data for 2001 not available  24 
Sample for audit committee characteristics tests (H2)  309 
Less, 
 -Audit committee formed prior to 1993 
 -Listed with audit committee in place 
 -Complete annual report data for pre/post audit 
committee formation years not available 
 
80 
133 
24 
          
 
 
 
237 
Sample for audit committee formation tests (H1)  72 
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Table 2 
Panel A: Sample of 309 companies used for audit committee characteristics tests by 
industry group 
 
Industry group Number Percentage 
Capital goods 33 10.7 
Commercial services and supplies 21 6.8 
Energy 20 6.5 
Food, beverage and tobacco 29 9.4 
Healthcare equipment and services 18 5.8 
Hotels, restaurants and leisure 14 4.5 
Materials 71 23.0 
Media 20 6.5 
Pharmaceuticals and biotechnology 16 5.2 
Retailing 21 6.8 
Software and services 25 8.1 
Technology hardware and equipment 10 3.2 
Telecommunication services 11 3.5 
Total 309 100 
 
Panel B: Number of audit committees formed each year by 72 ASX listed companies 
that formed their audit committees following the 1993 requirements for audit 
committee disclosures. 
 
Year of audit committee formation Number of companies 
1993 6 
1994 14 
1995 12 
1996 15 
1997 4 
1998 9 
1999 6 
2000 6 
Total 72 
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Table 3  
Comparisons of earnings quality for the years pre and post audit committee 
formation for 72 ASX listed companies 
 
Panel A: Matched-pairs t-tests  
Variable N  Min. Max. Median Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
t  
EQJones(pre) 69 0.01 0.83 0.1209 0.2033 0.2046 3.058** 
EQJones(post) 69 0.00 0.83 0.0923 0.1370 0.1444 
EQDD(pre)  71 0.00 0.50 0.0561 0.0906 0.1047 -0.300 
EQDD(post) 71 0.00 0.72 0.0580 0.0961 0.1199 
 
Panel B: Pooled regression results 
 Variable Pred. sign EQJones EQDD 
Intercept  0.284 
(4.187)** 
0.098 
(2.220)* 
FORMATION 
 
- 
 
-0.066 
(-2.254)* 
0.007 
(0.350) 
ROA - -0.160 
(-2.512)** 
-0.047 
(-1.121) 
BDIND - 0.080 
(1.276) 
0.047 
(1.123) 
BDACCEX - -0.002 
(-0.018) 
0.025 
(0.421) 
BDLEGEX - 0.103 
(0.986) 
0.060 
(0.881) 
BDMEET - -0.006 
(-2.230)* 
-0.003 
(-1.494) 
BDSIZE - -0.003 
(-0.390) 
-0.002 
(-0.358) 
AUDITOR - -0.052 
(-1.647) 
0.007 
(0.363) 
Adjusted R
2
  0.098 -0.006 
F statistic  2.867** 0.901 
N  138 142 
* significant at the 0.05 level, ** significant at the 0.01 level (p-values are one-tailed) 
 
EQJones = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from modified Jones (1991) model (i.e., absolute value 
of abnormal accruals) 
EQDD = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) adjusted for Jones (1991) 
model variables (i.e., absolute value of regression residuals) 
FORMATION: 1 = year after audit committee formation; 0 = year before audit committee formation 
ROA = Return on assets calculated as operating profit after tax scaled by average total assets 
BDIND = Proportion of independent directors on the board 
BDSIZE = Number of board members 
BDACCEX = Proportion of directors on the board with accounting qualifications  
BDLEGEX = Proportion of directors on the board with legal qualifications  
BDMEET = Number of board meetings per annum 
AUDITOR: 1 = Big 5 or 6 auditor; 0 = Non-big 5 or 6 auditor 
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Table 4  
Descriptive statistics for 309 Australian listed companies in 2001 
 
Panel A Continuous variables 
Variable Minimum Maximum Median Mean Std Dev Skewness 
EQJones 0.00 2.66 0.09 0.18 0.25 4.32 
EQDD 0.00 1.29 0.05 0.10 0.15 4.83 
ACIND 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.53 0.34 -0.12 
ACACCEX 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.31 0.30 0.74 
ACLEGEX 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.13 0.20 1.49 
ACMEET 0.00 13.00 3.00 3.06 1.60 1.74 
ACSIZE 2.00 7.00 3.00 3.18 1.00 1.16 
BDIND 0.00 1.00 0.40 0.42 0.25 0.04 
BDACCEX 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.22 0.18 0.65 
BDLEGEX 0.00 0.50 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.99 
BDMEET 3.00 33.00 11.00 11.34 4.28 0.88 
BDSIZE 3.00 17.00 6.00 6.33 2.23 1.55 
TA ($M) 3.94 84,961.00 138.28 1,276.30 6,020.56 10.60 
LNTA 15.19 25.17 18.74 19.01 1.77 0.55 
LEV 0.00 2.52 0.47 0.46 0.26 2.34 
OPCYCLE 1.00 1050.00 48.00 65.68 96.94 6.32 
LNOC 0.00 6.96 3.87 3.72 1.02 -0.95 
       
Panel B Dichotomous variables 
Variable Frequency of 1s Frequency of 0s 
AUDITOR 247 (79.9%) 62 (20.1%) 
LOSS 108 (34.9%) 201 (65.1%) 
 
EQJones = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from modified Jones (1991) model (i.e., absolute value 
of abnormal accruals) 
EQDD = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model adjusted for Jones 
(1991) model variables (i.e., absolute value of regression residuals) 
ACIND = Proportion of independent directors on audit committee 
ACACCEX = Proportion of directors on audit committee with accounting qualifications  
ACLEGEX = Proportion of directors on audit committee with legal qualifications  
ACMEET = Number of audit committee meetings for the year 
ACSIZE = Number of audit committee members 
BDIND = Proportion of independent directors on the board 
BDACCEX = Proportion of directors on the board with accounting qualifications  
BDLEGEX = Proportion of directors on the board with legal qualifications  
BDMEET = Number of board meetings for the year 
BDSIZE = Number of board members 
TA = Total assets 
LNTA = Natural log of total assets 
LEV = Total liabilities divided by total assets 
OPCYCLE = Operating cycle measured as 360/(sales/average account receivables) 
LNOC = Natural log of operating cycle, measured as 360/(sales/average account receivables) 
AUDITOR: 1 = Big 5 or 6 auditor; 0 = Non-big 5 or 6 auditor 
LOSS: 1 = net income for the year is less than zero; 0 otherwise 
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Table 5  
Pearson and Spearman Correlations for 309 Australian listed companies in 2001 (Pearson correlations are above diagonal; p 
values are shown in parenthesis) 
 
 EQJones EQDD ACInd ACAccEx ACLegEx ACMeet ACSize BDInd BDAccEx BDLegEx BDMeet BDSize LNTA    Lev Auditor Loss LNOC 
EQJones - 0.01 
(0.818) 
-0.05 
(0.370) 
0.06 
(0.319) 
-0.05 
(0.343) 
-0.07 
(0.195) 
-0.01 
(0.226) 
-0.08 
(0.148) 
0.09 
(0.119) 
-0.05 
(0.369) 
0.04 
(0.537) 
-0.10 
(0.079) 
-0.09 
(0.114) 
0.06 
(0.286) 
0.10 
(0.071) 
0.11* 
(0.047) 
0.13* 
(0.035) 
EQDD 0.07 
(0.127) 
- 0.03 
(0.560) 
-0.14* 
(0.015) 
-0.04 
(0.468) 
-0.03 
(0.567) 
-0.11* 
(0.048) 
0.05 
(0.347) 
-0.11 
(0.053) 
0.00 
(0.998) 
0.01 
(0.802) 
-0.15** 
(0.008) 
-0.24** 
(0.000) 
-0.03 
(0.632) 
-0.05 
(0.394) 
0.17** 
(0.003) 
0.04 
(0.522) 
ACInd -0.07 
(0.252) 
-0.02 
(0.772) 
- -0.10 
(0.09) 
-0.07 
(0.235) 
0.19** 
(0.001) 
0.03 
(0.668) 
0.77** 
(0.000) 
-0.14* 
(0.018) 
-0.18** 
(0.002) 
0.07 
(0.252) 
0.16** 
(0.006) 
0.18** 
(0.002) 
-0.01 
(0.899) 
0.12* 
(0.039) 
-0.09 
(0.108) 
-0.05 
(0.423) 
ACAccEx 0.13* 
(0.025) 
-0.12* 
(0.043) 
-0.13* 
(0.018) 
- -0.20** 
(0.000) 
-0.03 
(0.554) 
-0.10 
(0.082) 
-0.12* 
(0.042) 
0.77** 
(0.000) 
-0.13* 
(0.024) 
0.05 
(0.356) 
-0.03 
(0.619) 
-0.00 
(0.983) 
0.08 
(0.175) 
-0.12* 
(0.029) 
-0.02 
(0.782) 
-0.06 
(0.290) 
ACLegEx 0.01 
(0.858) 
0.01 
(0.943) 
-0.07 
(0.213) 
-0.18** 
(0.002) 
- 0.04 
(0.534) 
-0.05 
(0.391) 
-0.12* 
(0.040) 
-0.17** 
(0.003) 
-0.69** 
(0.000) 
-0.05 
(0.396) 
0.10 
(0.075) 
0.16** 
(0.004) 
-0.02 
(0.788) 
0.04 
(0.499) 
-0.01 
(0.867) 
0.05 
(0.414) 
ACMeet -0.07 
(0.242) 
-0.04 
(0.503) 
0.20** 
(0.000) 
-0.01 
(0.824) 
0.09 
(0.117) 
- 0.21** 
(0.000) 
-0.04 
(0.540) 
-0.04 
(0.540) 
0.04 
(0.477) 
0.15** 
(0.008) 
0.34** 
(0.000) 
0.39** 
(0.000) 
0.10 
(0.083) 
0.15** 
(0.009) 
-0.20** 
(0.001) 
-0.04 
(0.284) 
ACSize -0.08 
(0.170) 
-0.12* 
(0.043) 
0.03 
(0.547) 
-0.07 
(0.250) 
0.04 
(0.484) 
0.16** 
(0.004) 
- 0.03 
(0.633) 
0.03 
(0.633) 
-0.06 
(0.294) 
0.09 
(0.110) 
0.33** 
(0.000) 
0.23** 
(0.000) 
0.12* 
(0.042) 
0.06 
(0.315) 
-0.13* 
(0.028) 
0.11 
(0.059) 
BDInd -0.11* 
(0.045) 
-0.02 
(0.690) 
0.77** 
(0.000) 
-0.14* 
(0.018) 
-0.10 
(0.074) 
0.22** 
(0.000) 
0.12* 
(0.035) 
- -0.16** 
(0.005) 
-0.15** 
(0.009) 
0.07 
(0.223) 
0.18** 
(0.002) 
0.26** 
(0.000) 
0.01 
(0.928) 
0.18** 
(0.001) 
-0.10 
(0.096) 
-0.01 
(0.888) 
BDAccEx 0.13* 
(0.021) 
-0.04 
(0.498) 
-0.16** 
(0.006) 
0.78** 
(0.000) 
-0.13 
(0.020) 
-0.01 
(0.900) 
0.07 
(0.258) 
-0.16** 
(0.006) 
- -0.15** 
(0.008) 
-0.12* 
(0.043) 
-0.12* 
(0.043) 
-0.04 
(0.519) 
0.06 
(0.323) 
-0.14* 
(0.015) 
0.02 
(0.775) 
-0.07 
(0.262) 
BDLegEx 0.02 
(0.724) 
-0.00 
(0.974) 
-0.16** 
(0.005) 
-0.12* 
(0.035) 
0.70** 
(0.000) 
0.09 
(0.115) 
-0.01 
(0.860) 
-0.13* 
(0.027) 
-0.11* 
(0.045) 
- -0.01 
(0.883) 
-0.01 
(0.883) 
0.09 
(0.106) 
0.09 
(0.132) 
-0.02 
(0.676) 
0.04 
(0.528) 
0.05 
(0.428) 
BDMeet 0.01 
(0.905) 
-0.01 
(0.917) 
0.10 
(0.074) 
0.07 
(0.252) 
-0.03 
(0.617) 
0.22** 
(0.000) 
0.13* 
(0.018) 
0.11 
(0.063) 
0.11 
(0.051) 
-0.05 
(0.405) 
- 0.01 
(0.899) 
0.09 
(0.132) 
0.11* 
(0.046) 
-0.01 
(0.819) 
0.04 
(0.535) 
-0.01 
(0.824) 
BDSize -0.13* 
(0.027) 
-0.19** 
(0.001) 
0.15** 
(0.009) 
-0.01 
(0.861) 
0.14* 
(0.012) 
0.28** 
(0.000) 
0.36** 
(0.000) 
0.17** 
(0.002) 
-0.09 
(0.134) 
0.05 
(0.364) 
0.03 
(0.565) 
- 0.26** 
(0.000) 
0.12* 
(0.030) 
0.21** 
(0.000) 
-0.17** 
(0.003) 
0.04 
(0.284) 
LNTA -0.09 
(0.114) 
-0.21** 
(0.000) 
0.16** 
(0.005) 
0.01 
(0.852) 
0.18** 
(0.002) 
0.43** 
(0.000) 
0.25** 
(0.000) 
0.25** 
(0.000) 
-0.00 
(0.953) 
0.12* 
(0.031) 
0.12* 
(0.032) 
0.52** 
(0.000) 
- .40** 
(0.000) 
0.34** 
(0.000) 
-0.32** 
(0.000) 
-0.04 
(0.480) 
Lev 0.03 
(0.567) 
-0.00 
(0.972) 
-0.03 
(0.636) 
0.07 
(0.209) 
0.06 
(0.268) 
0.11 
(0.054) 
0.15** 
(0.008) 
-0.00 
(0.950) 
0.07 
(0.229) 
0.09 
(0.123) 
0.16** 
(0.005) 
0.16* 
(0.005) 
0.42** 
(0.000) 
- 0.14* 
(0.016) 
-0.18** 
(0.002) 
-0.04 
(0.494) 
Auditor 0.09 
(0.098) 
-0.06 
(0.314) 
0.11* 
(0.047) 
-0.11 
(0.055) 
0.06 
(0.287) 
0.16** 
(0.006) 
0.10 
(0.089) 
0.17** 
(0.003) 
-0.10 
(0.091) 
0.01 
(0.898) 
-0.01 
(0.907) 
0.23** 
(0.000) 
0.34** 
(0.000) 
0.14* 
(0.018) 
- -0.09 
(0.113) 
-0.04 
(0.475) 
Loss 0.18** 
(0.002) 
0.19** 
(0.001) 
-0.09 
(0.123) 
-0.02 
(0.703) 
0.01 
(0.901) 
-0.22** 
(0.000) 
-0.11* 
(0.046) 
-0.09 
(0.117) 
-0.01 
(0.901) 
0.05 
(0.353) 
-0.01 
(0.904) 
-0.20** 
(0.000) 
-0.34** 
(0.000) 
-0.17** 
(0.002) 
-0.09 
(0.113) 
- 0.21** 
(0.000) 
LNOC 0.08 
(0.173) 
0.13* 
(0.025) 
-0.04 
(0.501) 
0.01 
(0.823) 
0.01 
(0.850) 
-0.10 
(0.109) 
0.09 
(0.140) 
-0.03 
(0.679) 
0.06 
(0.314) 
0.01 
(0.833) 
-0.02 
(0.748) 
-0.02 
(0.780) 
-0.09 
(0.138) 
-0.03 
(0.579) 
-0.07 
(0.222) 
0.19** 
(0.002) 
- 
* significant at the 0.05 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; Variable definitions are provided in table 4.
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Table 6  
Regression estimates of earnings quality variables on audit committee and control 
variables for 309 ASX listed companies in 2001 
Variable Pred. 
sign 
EQJones EQDD 
Intercept ? 0.295 
(1.902) 
0.403 
(3.304)** 
0.286 
(4.391)** 
0.305 
(3.925)** 
ACIND - 0.006 
(0.146) 
-0.034 
(-1.207) 
0.003 
(0.169) 
0.014 
(0.795) 
ACACCEX - 0.045 
(1.049) 
0.031 
(0.965) 
-0.038 
(-2.101)* 
-0.040 
(-1.916)* 
ACLEGEX - -0.016 
(-0.257) 
-0.001 
(-0.022) 
-0.015 
(-0.554) 
-0.012 
(-0.406) 
ACMEET - -0.002 
(-0.283) 
-0.002 
(-0.293) 
0.006 
(1.609) 
0.003 
(0.859) 
ACSIZE - 0.006 
(0.496) 
0.005 
(0.554) 
-0.004 
(-0.824) 
-0.010 
(-1.591) 
AUDITOR - 0.080 
(2.350)* 
0.070 
(2.765)** 
0.001 
(0.100) 
0.006 
(0.349) 
LNTA - -0.019 
(-2.140)* 
-0.021 
(-2.930)** 
-0.012 
(-3.357)** 
-0.012 
(-2.616)** 
LEV + 0.101 
(1.545) 
0.015 
(0.309) 
0.063 
(2.310)* 
0.052 
(1.640) 
LOSS + 0.039 
(1.379) 
0.042 
(2.025)* 
0.019 
(1.606) 
0.012 
(0.904) 
LNOC + 0.023 
(1.845)* 
- 0.001 
(0.285) 
- 
Capital goods ? - -0.022 
(-0.379) 
- -0.019 
(-0.534) 
Commercial, services and 
supplies 
? - 0.017 
(0.285) 
- 0.007 
(0.167) 
Energy ? - 0.054 
(0.855) 
- -0.017 
(-0.419) 
Food, beverage and 
tobacco 
? - 0.368 
(6.302)** 
- -0.023 
(-0.629) 
Healthcare equipment 
and services 
? - 0.012 
(0.189) 
- 0.004 
(0.096) 
Hotels, restaurants and 
leisure 
? - -0.014 
(-0.217) 
- -0.025 
(-0.592) 
Materials ? - 0.022 
(0.410) 
- -0.005 
(-0.142) 
Media ? - 0.242 
(3.861)** 
- -0.017 
(-0.433) 
Pharmaceuticals and 
biotechnology 
? - -0.037 
(-0.559) 
- 0.033 
(0.780) 
Retailing ? - -0.000 
(-0.001) 
- -0.008 
(-0.203) 
Software and services ? - 0.121 
(2.029)* 
- 0.031 
(0.798) 
Telecommunication 
services 
? - 0.423 
(6.120)** 
- 0.082 
(1.861) 
Adjusted R2  0.033 0.424 0.050 0.073 
F statistic  1.977* 11.703** 2.469** 2.132** 
N  283 306 282 305 
 
* significant at the 0.05 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level (p-values are one-tailed when direction is as 
predicted, otherwise two-tailed). Variable definitions are provided in table 4. 
  
 
